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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utah

LA MAR PEAY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO

CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body COII"pO-

rate and politic, and :MERRILL

CHRIS~

CASE

NO. 9722

TOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHffiLEY PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH,
and LA MAR EMPEY, Members of said

Board,

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS• BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action contests the validity of a special election
held in Provo City School District February 6, 1962, called
by the Board of Education, pursuant to Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, now identified as Section 537-24. Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The appeal is taken from an order of ·the lower court
granting respondenrt:s' motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim foc which relief may be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Because it appears to us thart the ~statement of facts
in .Aippellant's brief inadvertently omitted ~certain facts and
is, we believe, unduly condensed, we shall present rur staJtement of the facts ibef'Ore the court.
Thls case was determined in the lower 1court on the
pleadings. To tlle amended complaint (R. 6 ff) respond-

ents addressed three motions: a motion to strike, a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to Sltate a
claim upon Which relief may be granted, and a motion for
summary judgment (R. 18).
After making these motions, not before, ·as st:aJted page
3 of A:ppellant's brief, respooden1:s filed an answer to the
amended oomplaint. (R. 21ff) and notice of readiness for
trial (R. 25). The C'Otlrt then set the matter for pre-trial
and argument rm the moti·ons (R. 26) .
The undisputed facts as shown from the pleadings are
tJhat tJhe Board of Education of Provo City School District,
pursuant to Section 11 of Ohapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961
(53-7-24, Utah Code .Amlotated 1953), called a special elec·
tion for February 6, 1962, to vote oo the followm,g ques-

tion:
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo City, State of
U1Jah be authorized to maintain a 'voted leeway' pro.~ as provided in Section 11,- Chapter 104, Laws of
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Utah 1961, not to exceed ten per cent of the minimum
basic program provided by law."

The election thus called was held, the votes cast were
thereafter canvassed, and 1:Jhe proposition declared passed
by a vote of 2,224 for, and 1,829 against.

No question is raised as to the procedural manner m
which the Boa:rd called the election. Except as pointed
rut hereafter, no question is raised as to the sufficiency of
the notice of election, nor are questions mised concerning
the length of time between first publication of the notice
and date of the election, lC~Ca~tioo of the polls, names of
judges, hours during whioh the polls shall remain open, and
the like. Except as further pointed out hereafter, no question is raised as to the conduct of the election or the oanv~

of returns.

The amended complaint, without citation to specific con~
stltuoonal provisions, asserted that the statute under whlch
the election was called and held is unCOOSJti.tutiooal (a) because it is vacaue and uncel"tJain, and (ib) because it permitted qualified electors, without reference to whether they
had paid a property tax in the precemng year, tO vote
oo the proposition. It further alleged that the notice calling
the election was insufficient to i.nfoml the electors as to
the proposiHon they were called to vote upon.
The Appellant's pleadings nowhere raise rthe issue as
to sufficiency of the title to Chapter 104, Laws of_ U1la!h
1961. under the mandate of Section 23, Article VI, Utah ,
Constitution.

Rest>ondents' answer raises a question of fact. It denied that noo-.taxpaying electors voted, or in the alternative,
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that if they so did, there were insufficient such votes to
change tJhe result. Under the ruling of the trial court, this
i>Ssue became immaterial.
ThTee issues of law were raised and argued at the pre.
trial and argument on the motions (R. 28) :
(1) Is Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961
rendered unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertJainty,
by reason of its reference Section 53-2-12, U.C.A. '53 (which
would render it unintelligible)?
(2) Is !i!t further unOOllSiti:tutional because the questioned s1:1atute does not require a property qualification of
electors?
( 3) Was rthe notice of electJion sufficient to Worm
the electoos as to the proposition they were to vote upon?
The trial court t!ound against appellant on all three
isSiues (R. 28) and entered its order <tisrrrissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon ·whlch relief may
be granted· (R. 29). The appeal is rfrom this order.
·The additional issue argued by appellant-that the
questioned statute violates Section 23, Article VI, Utah Constiturt:ion_.was found iby the court IlOit to have been raised
in the pleadings. However, the trial court opined that the
statute was not vioJative of that section. Though not thus
mised in tlhe pleadings, appellant argues the point in his
brief, page 12, point IT. We will meet that argument with·
out ia qmbble on procedural grounds.
Issue number (2,) above, is the questioned statute unCOOSJtitutiooal because it requires no property qualifications
o!f electors voting on the proposition, was' argued extensively before the trial court. It is not cited by Appellant
here as a ground for reversal, nor is this point argued. We
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therefore take it to be abandoned on this appeal and shall
not belabor the question further. Reid v. Anderson, 116
Utah 455, 211 P. 2d 206.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT CAN CORRECT THE PATENT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN SECTION 11, CHAPTER 104,
LAWS OF UTAH 1961 THUS REMOVING ANY :pos..
SIBLE QUESTION OF ITS BEING VAGUE, INDEFINITE
OR UNCERTAIN.

Chapter 104, Laws of UtaJh 1961, establiShes the
method of financing operations of public elemmrtlacy and
secondary schools in this Stalte. Mter making provision
for a uniform basic minimum scllool program, and providing for certain other permissive sources of additiooal operating revenue to local boards, :the Act, in sec1Jion 11, here
questioned, purports to give local boards of education, upon
grant of authority by the electorate, power to rad:se yet additional revenue locally by means orf addirtiooal ad valorem
levy. This is referred to as the "voted leeway" program.
It is this provision, invoked by respondents, which appelbnt here questions.
The first paraooraph of section 11 states:
"With the consent of a majority of 11he electors of 1lhe
district voting at an election or elections held far that
purpose in the manner ,set fortftl in Section 53-2-12
Ptah Code Annotated, 1953, any district may main~
t~in a school program in excess of the cost of :the program refeiTed to in Sections 9 and 10 above. Said
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additional program shall be known as rthe 'voted J.ee.
way' progrnm of the district. Said voted leeway pro.
gram shall not e.x1ceed an amount equal rto 20% of ·the
basic program of :the di.strict.''
Our position is that the reference rto Section 53-2-12,
Uta!h Oode Annotated 1953, fur !Vhe manner of calling the
election is a patent :typographim:l eiTOr, wlhich the court
can OOITeCt, SJUJbstituting t:herefor SectiOIIl 53-7-12, Utah
Code ArnnOitlated 1953.
The satute erroneously cited treats of the general powers and dutieS of the State Board of Education, having
nothing to do with 1Jhe financing of local school districts or
electJions. On the Olfu.er hand, section 53-7-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, ~eats specifioall.y rthe call·ing of special
elections by local boards of educaltion.

Ohapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, repealed the former
statutory p.vovisd.ons for financing public school operations,
a system whloh also embraced the "voted leeway" fueory.
Among the promo.ns thus repealed was section 53-7-8,
Utah Oode Annortated 1953, which provided in part:
'' . . . . With 1lhe consent of a majority of rthe electors
of the district voting a:t an election or elections held
for that purpose in the manner set fOTth in Section 537-12, Utaih Code Annotated 1953, any district may
maintain a schoo~ program ln excess of the above men·tioned cost in an amount not exceeding an additional
2·5% of the cost of the basic program . . . ."
The statute here attacked repla1ces thls section. It
makes sense, fits tJhe over-all financing plan, and has been
followed by several local districts. To refuse to read Chapter 7 in lieu orf Chapter 2 in the questioned statute is to
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tYld

with a non sequitur; to read it as Chapter 7 makes the

act barmol1iioos and avoids nonsense. The legislative intent
1.s clt·ar. The trial coort merely corrected an obvious typographical error. The rule of const.ructioo we invoke is found
in 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d Ed.) pages 460462, Sec. 4925:
ueow-ts have permitted the substitution of one word

for another: where it is necessary to make tlhe act harmonious or to avoid repugnancy or inconsistency, ...
where it is obvious that ·the word used in the act is t!he
result of clerical error, or mistake, wihere the substitution will make the act sensible . . . .
ucourts have denied the power: Where t!he WOifd to be
substituted affects the essence of the act and there is
an ambigudcy as to what was intended, wlhere it would

involve the exercise of a legislative function, where
the act is ambiguous, where two legislative purposes
a..re suggested and both render the act 'effective.''
This court has followed that rule. In the. case ofPeople vs. Hill, 3 Utah 334 (353) , 3 Pac. 75, tJhe court read a
criminal statute con'tlad.ning a reference to a section 152 as
though it were 151 in order to carry out the ll1Bllifest intention of the legislature. See also Morrison-Merrill & Co.
vs.Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 363, 18 P. 2d 295; Chez
ex rei Weber College vs. Building Commission, 93 Utah 538,
74 P. 2d 687; Norville vs. Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97
P. 2d 937; 126 ALR 1318.
Appellant appears to take the position that the sta:turte

in question, though read as urged by the responden1s and

as COI'Tected by the trial court (R. 28), still contains an
ambiguity in that the statutes referred to for the rna.nner
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of calling and conducting the election refer to ~yers

ad qualified electors who shall have paid a property tax.
We again state that thoogh the appellant rurged before rthe trial court that the act was Ull1Constitutional ·because it provided for the ViQiting of qualified electors in the
~hool district without regaro to property qualifications,
he has abandoned this argument on appeal. He cites the
refermces to property qualifieations orn:ly on the issue of
vagueness, indcliniteness and uncertainty.
It is remembered that we deal here solely with the
manner of calling the election. Section 53-7-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, provides:

". . . the Board of Education shaH give such reasonable
notice of such submission as it may deem proper and
slhall foHow the rocedure in elections fO!r the issuance
of bonds so far as applicable .•.•.• " (Emphasis added)
The procedure for the calling and COinductdng of bond

elections is set forth in Sections 53-10-3 to 6 inclusive, Utah
Oode Annotated 1953.
Appellant does not assert that re8IX)ndents failed to
follow the mechanical procedure set out in those sections,
he meTely asserts that an ambiguity exists because a property qualification is 1nteTposed on bond elections but is not
interposed in "voted leeway" edectio!llS.
Under the pro~sions of Chapter 104, Laws of Utah
1961 we assert that we see no ambiguity; no debt is created
by reason of the voted leeway election. All rthat was sought
and all that was given by the electorate was permission or
authority to operate the school system at a higher budgetary level, from local SQiUrces of revenue, than the board
could othe'rwise provide.
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POINT II
THE TITLE TO CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF UTAH
1961. MEETS THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY ARTICLE VI. SECITON 23, UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The pertinent Constitutional provision referred to

states:
"... No bill shall be passed (by the Legislature) containing more than one subject, whioh shall be clearly
expressed in its title."
Violation of this provision by Ohapter 104, Laws of
Utah 1961 is not asserted in the pleadings. However, as
stated earlier, we will not belaJbor this question. The trial
court considered it, stating "thart: the law is not ,invalid on
the above grounds.' (R. 28)

This court has had several occasions to examine legislative acts in the light of that constitutional limitation. In
the case of Kent Club vs. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P. 2d
~70. the court upheld a statute amendatory of the coqJoration code which dealt \Vi.th the regulation, control and
revocation of charters of non-profit social clubs, although
the Act. in effect, also amended the Liquor Control Act.
We quote from the opinion the court's statement defining
the extent of the constitutional interdiction:
1) The title and the act should be surveyed in the
light of the purpose of the above quoted section of the
Constitution, which is to guard against the surreptitious or inadvertent inclusion of subjects in legislation

u (

without legislators and the public being aware of its

contents:
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"(2) Due consideration should be given to the fact
that legislati0111 is often necessarily comprehensive in
covering a whoJe subject and that it is not invalid simply ;because certain porti0111S, if cOJlSiidered in isolationI
would seem unreliated, but is proper so loog as all the
provisi0111S have a direct relartionship to 1lhe subject
legislated urpon;
A liberal view should be ta:ken O!f both the act
and the oonstitutional provisions so as not to hamper
the law-making porweT, but to pern1it the adoption of
·comprehensive measures .covering a whole subject;

" ( 3)

" (4) That each .A!ct ·must ·be viewed in its entirety and
upon the basis of t!he circumstances and 00111ditions peculiar to it, and must be regarded as co!llStitutional unless it plainly appears that the basic purpose of rthe
oonstitutional provision is violated."
See also State vs. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d
1075, and State vs. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P. 2d 647.

We quote the title to Chapter 104, Laws o.f Utah, 1961:
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE STATE-SUPPORTED
:MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM, STATING THE
OQSTS THEREOF, PRESCRIBING TI-llE AMOUNT
OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS '"IO BE MADE BY THE
STATE AND THE VARIOUS SCHOOL DIS'ffiiCfS
TOWARlD THE PAYMENT OF THE COSTS THEREOF AND THE MANNER IN WIDCH THE VARIOUS SCHOOL DISTRICfS MAY QUALIFY FOR
PARTICIPATION THEREIN; ENABLING SCHOOL
DISTRIC"rS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SCHOOL
SERVICES AND PROGRAMS; PRESCRIBING THE
MANNER IN WHICH TAX LEVIES BY THE STATE
SI-IALL BE MADE FOR PURPOSES OF MAKING
SAID CONTRIBUTIONS; ENABLING THE SCHOOL
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DISTRICfS TO MAKE TAX LEVIES; PROVIDING
FOR THE COLLECTION OF SAID TAX LEVIES
BY THE RESPECTIVE COUNTIES; PROVllDiiNG
FOR TilE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS
AND REPEALING SECTIONS (named sections;) ... "

It is observed from the title and from the Act itself
that the Act deals comprehensively with the subject of
school district operating revenue. It deals with nothing
more than that. Most assuredly no one ean With reason
assert that the Act, in view of the title, contains the evil
calculated to be avoided by means orf the ·constitutional provision here invoked-the misleading of the public and legislature by inserting intentionally or inadvertently any provision touching upon subject matters not disclosed in the
title.

The title to Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, touches
directly upon the subject matter contained in sec1Jion 11.
We quote from that title:
..... ENABLING SCHOOL DISTRICfS TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL SCHOOL SERVICES AND PROGRAMS; ... ENABLING THE SCHOOL DISTRICfS
TO MAKE TAX LEVIES ... ''

Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution, does NOT
require the act to be restated in the title.
Appellant would have usbe1i.eve ·that Chapter 104, Laws
of Utah 1961, deals onJy with what is denominated the
"Minbnwn School Program," or that 1lhe "voted leeway"
Pl'O\ision of section 11 does noot bear upon the general subject of school district operating revenue. If this is not his
JlOSition (and his position, incidentally, is nort clear), then
he would have us believe that the subject of a basic or mini-
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mum school financing plan cannot be combined with pro.
visions for pemlissive additional S!Cihool operating revenue
in 1he same act. We submit 1Jhese positions are untenable.
POINT ill
THE PROPOSITION SUBMI'ITED ~0 THE ELECTORS WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
The propositioo placed oo the ballot and published in
the notice of ·the special election reads:
"Shall the Board m Education of Provo City, State of
Utah ibe authorized to maintain a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Sectinn 11, Chapter 104, Laws of
Utah 1961, nort to exceed ten per eent of t!he minimum
basic program provided by law "

Appellant attacks this proposition under Point ill of
his brief for the reason that it does nort inform the voter
of "the purpose or cost of 't:lhe proposed program." (Appellants brief p. 1'6) . Authorities cited are propos!itioos to
create debt and are, we therefore submit, not in pomt. This
litigation deals solely with maintenance and opemting revenues for SKjhoo~s. No d~bt is incurred by the action of
respondentS here under attack.
In adapting Ohaprte·r 104, Laws of Utah 1961, the Legislature proceeded under two constitutional provisions, Artide X, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Article Xlll, Section 7, Utah Constitution. These prOJVide for the Uniform
Schoo~ Fund and its administration. It ·behooves us toreview briefly these provisions and legislation adopted there-

under.
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Tbe 1946 Amendment to Article XIII, Section 7, Utah
Constitution, established a policy of the State to·· underwrite, with llmitatlons, a "minimum ·school program"
throughout all districts of the State, and directed that rt:he
Legislature im:plement this policy by law. The original
legislative pronouncement thereunder, Chapter 80, Laws
of Utah 1947, established the pattern material here; and
though practically eaoh general session Olf the Legislature
since then has amended or substituted Acts on this subjt'\'t. the policy and mechanics have remained essentially
thl' same.

The Legislature establishes a minimum school progr'am
t>xpressed, not in rate of taxation, but in monetary cost a:c·

eording to the school population of the district, expressed in
..distribution units," arrived at by a formula calculated to
equalize certain administ:Tative and overhead cost differentials between large and small districts. Suffice it !here to
point out that the detennination is the operating cost or
amount to be disbursed, NOT the rate of taxation.
The local board of education is then required to fix a
stated levy and the additional amount, if any, required to

meet the minimum school program fixed by the Legislature is then contributed from the Uniform ~hool Fund.
Since 1947, variations have been built upon this procedure,
but the theory has remained constant.
By way of illustratioo only, a chart is included at 1lhe
end of this brief, demonstrating 1:Jhe manner of operations

of C.bapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961. The minimum school
program is determined by the Legislature to be $5,400.00
per distribution unit The local board must fix a levy of
12 mills. The difference, if any, between the sum this will
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raise and $5,:100.00 per distribution unit, is contributed
the distr:ict from the Unifmm School Fund.

to

The remainder of Chapter 104, Larws of Utah 1961, is
permissive. Shoruld the local board wish, it may participate
in
additional state supported "leeway" operating pro..
gram, expressed in monetary 1COst, not a fixed levy, by fixing an additional fom mill ad valorem levy, the State making up the diffeTence. At this level, ·the Smte's COilltribu-

an

tion ceases.
The Aet 1Jhen gives the local board· the authority, should
it wish to e~and the operating school program further, to
raise additional funds .by means of an additional local ad
VJalorem levy of six mills oc a levy wmch will raise a sum
equal to tihirteen per cent of the basic program, $5,400.00
per dis~bution unit.
'Dqe .Act then ~ts the loca1 board to establish an
operating school program in addition to sums raised by the
meallls set; :fjorth above, up to 20% o!f the basic program
cost, $5,400.00 per distrybution unit, but to do this, the board
of education must have the authority conferred by the electors of the disJrict. . This provision is oontained in Section
11 of the Act, hePe attacked.
The proposition voted upon is definite and clear----should
the board of education have authority to establish a school
operating program for the district, costing an additionallO%
of the bask program, $5,400.00 per distribution unit The
mill levy could not be fixed. The election was held February 6, 1962. The assessed valuation o!f the district is not
determined until August. Tne board's budget is fixed in
June. .Assessed valuations and school censuses change.
The Legislature changes the sum per distribution unit to
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be apportioned from the Unifonn School Fund. The authority sought by the board from the electors is a continuing one. To attempt to phrase the proposition otherwise
than done would not only be ridi,culous, it would be impos-

sible.
Neither the act nor the constitutional provisions Wldt•rtake to fix levies. They merely limit the power· to do
so. Most of the levies for school operation, at least £or the
poorer districts, are not even fixed by the local boards of
edueation. Levies, if any, for the Untfrorm School Fund
are determined by the State Tax Commission based upon
estimates of that Commission as to other available revenue
SOW'CeS and upon estimates of the State Board of Education as to needs. Levies to carry out the purely local efforts of boards of education above the State supported school
program, are fixed by the Board of County Commissioners.
We see nothing wrong wi1:Ih this. Appellant points out
nothing. In this State levies are generally fixed administlatively, SU!bject to limitations contained in the enabling
legislation. The Legislature could as well have given the
board of education the power conferred in Section 11, Laws
of Utah 1961, without prior authority from the electors.
It c00se this additional limitation upon the additional expansion of the school program. The proposition submitted, as found by the trial court, adequately informed the
electors of the authority sought by the board of education.
CONCLUSION
We are not her concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom of the Legislative arrangement for financing operations of the pulic schools. That is a political question not
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subject to judicial review. Allen vs. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d, 32,
305 P.2d 490. Rather, we are concerned with 1:Jhe validity
of an act of the Legislature and actions taken by respondents pursuant thereto.
We take it to be fundamental legal axioms that, first,
a state constitution is a limitation upon the power of a legislature, and not ~ grant of power, second, all presumptioos
and intendments are resolved in favor of validity of legislative acts, and third, that a questiooed statute will1be given
a oonstnliction consistent with validity irf at all possible.
Viewed thus, and in the light of previous pronouncements of this Court, the Act here questioned is valid, the
action of respondents taken thereunder .proper, and appellants positioo is, we submit, unte.na;ble.
Respectfull submitted,

ALLEN B. SORENSEN
of YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN
Attorney for Respondents
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